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This paper presents the results of estimation of the model of interaction between social 
transfers and remittances. Compared to previous studies, this paper estimates non-monotonic 
“crowding out” effect by an innovative empirical model specification. The model is then 
estimated by the two-stage Heckman’s selection method, where the receipt of remittances is 
the first stage, and amount of remittances received second stage dependent variable. The 
findings suggest that social transfers crowd-in remittances and that the predominant motive 
for sending remittances to Bosnia is exchange. In addition, the results do not support the Cox 
(1997) hypothesis about non-monotonic transfer motives. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has recently gone through very dramatic periods of conflict and 
displacement. During the period of war in Bosnia, about 5% of population were killed, and 
more than a half of its population was displaced. Half of them, or 25% of total population 
were displaced internally, while another 25% of total population decided to flee from the 
country (Ibreljic et al., 2006). Even today, it is estimated that every ninth Bosnian lives 
abroad (Koser and Van Hear, 2002). As a consequence, Bosnia is the sixth leading country in 
terms of receiving remittances as a percentage of GDP (around 23%, World Bank Global 
Economic Prospects, 2006). About 18% of Bosnian population are below poverty line, while 
another 30% are just above it (UNDP, 2006). The official unemployment rate is above 40%
1. 
During the war, more than 400.000 housing units (1/3 of total housing units in the country) 
were destroyed. Moreover, the war has created new vulnerable groups in need of social 
transfers, such as disabled and/or unemployed war veterans and families of killed soldiers. All 
the above significantly increased the number of individuals in the need of some form of social 
transfers. This is particularly burdensome for a post-war transition country with relatively 
limited fiscal revenues.  
                                                 
1 Though, more realistic estimated, based on the Labour Force Survey, say that this rate is actually 29%. The 
difference between the official and survey-based unemployment rates is due to the large informal employment.  
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  The overall social transfers in Bosnia-Herzegovina amount to about 13% of its GDP 
(World Bank, 2006), majority of which goes to pensions and health care services. But also, 
large proportion of these transfers goes to non-insurance based benefits. They include 
veterans-related benefits, child care allowance and social assistance. Veteran-related benefits 
are non-means tested, implying their limited impact on poverty reduction. A household, 
regardless of its income status, can be eligible for several transfers, based on different criteria. 
The main purpose of social transfers should be to reduce inequality and poverty. But, the 
evidence is mixed. Some social transfers, such as pensions or unemployment insurance, are 
designed in such a way that increases inequality, as these transfers are linked to the amount of 
contributory wage, resulting in larger percentage of benefits transferred to high income 
families (Feldstein, 1974, Browning and Browning, 1994, Perry et al., 2006). Besides that, 
studies from different countries reveal large ineffectiveness of social transfers in poverty and 
inequality reduction due to inappropriate eligibility criteria and poor targeting. As reported in 
World Bank (2009), pre-transfer poverty level in Bosnia-Herzegovina is 19.2, while after 
transfers it is reduced to 18.6%, meaning that transfers contribute to the reduction of poverty 
by only 6 percentage points. 
According to the World Bank (2006), Bosnia-Herzegovina is the sixth leading country in 
terms of receiving remittances as a share of GDP. They amount to around 2 billion EUR, 
which is 20% of Bosnian GDP. Moreover, remittances represent the most significant inflow 
to BiH, as they are six times larger than FDI and three times than ODA to this country. The 
data from the Living in BiH 2004 survey show that approximately 11% of households in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina receive remittances. The average value of remittances received is about 
95 KM per month. The impact of remittances on poverty and inequality has been heavily 
investigated so far (Milanovic, 1987; Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki, 1988; Prasad and Sardana, 
1989; Adams, 1992; Russell, 1992; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Taylor 1999; World Bank 2006; 
Brown and Markova, 2006; Jimenez, 2007; Giannetti et al, 2009), but the available empirical 
evidence does not provide clear-cut answer about its sign. On one side, there is evidence 
supporting the idea that remittances are usually sent to richer families, who are more able to 
bear the costs of migration, thus increasing inequality. On the other side, several studies 
support the hypothesis that migrants are selected from lower tail of income distribution, thus 
remittances sent to these families decrease inequality. There were no analyses of the use of 
remittances in Bosnia, but the sporadic evidence suggests that vast majority of remittances are 
being used for consumption.   
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Before analysis of the overall effects of social transfers and/or remittances on poverty 
and inequality in a country with widespread receipts of both types of transfers, possible 
interaction between them should be taken into account.  The link between the receipt of the 
social and private transfers is known as the “crowding out” effect. Depending on the motives 
for sending remittances, the amount received by families may change once they begin 
receiving the social transfers. The sign of this effect is purely empirical question, as two 
competing hypotheses are in place. According to the first, remittances are driven by altruistic 
motives by senders, thus any increase in social transfers received by a household will 
decrease amount of remittances received. In contrary, remittances are exchange driven, so 
they will increase as a result of increase of social transfers. Accordingly, the sign of the 
“crowding out” effect also reveals predominant motive for sending remittances.  
This study is the first known attempt to investigate the presence of the “crowding out” 
effect in Bosnia. The definition of social transfers to be analysed in this study is reduced to 
the non-contribution based social transfers, such as veteran-related benefits and child 
allowance. The reason for this is that contribution based benefits, such as unemployment 
benefits and pensions, cannot be considered as an exogenous source of income as non-
contribution based transfers. As the key objective of this study is analysis of the “crowding 
out” effect, then the contribution based benefits, which are received as an alternative to a 
wage, should not be considered as an exogenous source of income that increases overall 
income of recipient. In contrary, non-contribution based benefits can be considered as 
exogenous increase of the overall income. Both domestic and international remittances, as 
well as charity, will be included in the analysis, but the distinction between them will be made 
in order to reveal possible differences in the extent of the “crowding out” of these transfers by 
social transfers, as well as for the policy purposes. 
In this study, we attempt to analyse different impact of social transfers on remittances 
assuming that the motives for remittances are non-monotonic, meaning that they may differ 
between different income groups of recipients. We might expect that remittances to lower 
income recipients may be more altruistically motivated, so they might decrease after increase 
of social transfers and their poverty reduction goal may not necessarily be reached. 
Remittances to higher income recipients may be more exchange motivated and therefore 
change in the same direction with social transfers. In such relations, social transfers would 
increase poverty and inequality among households, particularly when the receipt of 
remittances by non-poor is matched with ineffective social transfers’ policies. There is 
evidence supporting these ideas, but most studies were based on the analysis of cross- 
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sectional data, which does not assure appropriate capture of the dynamic effect. Therefore, it 
is necessary to test these ideas by using panel datasets.  
  The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents review of the literature on 
the relationship between the social transfer and remittances. The section three briefly informs 
about the characteristics of social security system and inflows of remittances to Bosnia. In the 
section four, the theoretical model of non-monotonic “crowding-out” effect and the new 
specification of an empirical model controlling for such an effect are presented. Also, method 
and data used for its estimation are described. Section five presents results of the model 




2.  Literature on the “crowding-out” effect 
As the amount of remittances inflows increased significantly in recent years
2, the cash 
transfers, public and private, their interactions and the impact on the reduction of poverty and 
inequality have received appropriate attention in the literature. Social transfers increase a 
household’s income. As they are primarily targeting poorer households, they relationship with 
both poverty and inequality is expected to be negative, meaning that increase in these 
transfers should reduce both poverty and inequality in a country. The extent to which these 
objectives are reached depends on the effectiveness in implementation of the transfers 
policies, as well as responses of private to public transfers.  
  In a country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, which receives a large amount of 
remittances, the effectiveness of the social transfer programmes in reduction of poverty and 
inequality in the country does not depend on the design and implementation of these 
programmes only, but also on the response of the remittances to the receipt of these transfers. 
This response is usually named transfers derivative (Gibson et al., 2006). The direction of this 
response is determined by the motives for sending remittances. They can be motivated by 
altruism
3 (Becker, 1974) or exchange (Bernheim et al., 1985). If the motives for these 
                                                 
2 The World Bank (2008) estimated the amount of international remittances to the developing world in 2005 to 
be US $191 billion. 
3 Becker's altrustic motives for transfers are based on the idea of interdependent preferences. According to this, 
parents  have preferenes regarding their children's consumption. With such preferences, their utility does not 
depend only on their own consumption, but also on the consumption of others. This is in line with the migration 
theories that explain migration decision motivated by the diversification of risk to the family income. Thus, 
migrants will increase their remittances to the family memebrs left behind once their income is negatively  
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transfers are based on altruism, increase in a recipient’s income as a result of public transfers 
will decrease amount of private transfers. This is interpreted as crowding-out of private by 
public transfers (Cox, 1987). In the presence of the crowding-out effect, the positive effects of 
social transfers can be neutralized by the response of remittances, as the intended outcome of 
support to vulnerable groups will be at least partially transferred to senders of remittances 
(Altonji et al.,  1997). The opposite effect is possible when remittances are based on the 
exchange motive and increase as a result of increase in social transfers, which means that 
public transfers crowd-in private ones (Cox, 1987, 1990; Altonji et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 
2001). If private transfers are predominantly motivated by exchange, where transfer is made 
as a payment for provision of certain services by recipient to a donor, then the sign of 
relationship between these two is not completely clear, but most authors argue that it is 
positive. Their explanation is that the rise in income of provider of services through the 
receipt of social transfers increases the “price” of such services, implying increase in receipt 
of remittances. Moreover, if remittances are motivated by self-interested intention of sender to 
increase their inheritance claims, then increase in income of recipients increase potentially 
inherited wealth and, consequently, transfers of remittances. Therefore, the sign of the 
relationship between social transfers and remittances is purely empirical question. This study 
is the first known attempt to estimate this relationship in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will give 
additional insight into the possible causes of the reported large ineffectiveness of social 
transfers (World Bank, 2009), but also reveal the predominant motive for sending remittances 
to this country.  
Most of the empirical studies so far have failed to find strong crowding-out effect. For 
example, one of the first studies by Cox and Jakubson (1995) found that a one dollar increase 
in public transfers in the US would reduce private transfers by no more than a 12 cent. Altonji 
et al. (1997) estimated that a dollar decrease in a child’s will increase parents’ transfers to a 
child by only 13 cents. Still, a possibility of non-monotonic relationship between public and 
private transfers was recognized recently, which might be one of the explanations of the 
failures of previous studies (Albarran and Attanasio, 2002). Increase in income may cause the 
motives of transfers to change, thus causing the sign of the relationship between public and 
private transfers to be different at different levels of recipient’s income (Cox et al., 1997). 
Thus linear models would be misspecified and not capable to recognize the true crowding-out 
                                                                                                                                                          
affected by adverse conditions in a country, for example. The family income risk sharing strategy results in the 




effect. Another reason for this failure of previous studies is that the empirical evidence from 
developed countries, with a long history of public transfers which might have already 
replaced private transfers, might be misleading. Therefore, recent studies have focused on 
collecting evidence from developing countries, allowing for non-monotonic relationship 
between public and private transfers. Cox et al. (2004) investigated this possibility by a 
threshold model and estimated the transfer derivatives to be -0.4 for the poorest households 
and almost zero for richer households in Philippines. In a study of relationship between public 
pensions for the elderly and private transfers in South Africa, Jensen (2003) estimates that for 
each rand increase in public pension income, transfers made by children reduce by 0.25-0.30 
rand. Gibson et al. (2006) estimated transfer derivatives in four countries four developing 
countries - China, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam – to be in a range between 0 
and 0.08, concluding that non-monotonic crowding-out effect of public on private transfers is 
not important feature of transfer behaviour in developing countries. 
 
 
3.  A background: Social transfers and remittances in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
The period of transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina from planned to market economy, 
which started in early 1990s, was combined with the period of destructive war, which had 
severe impact on poverty and inequality in the country. During the period of war in Bosnia, 
about 5% of population were killed, and more than a half of its population was displaced. Half 
of them, or 25% of total population were displaced internally, while another 25% of total 
population decided to flee from the country (Ibreljic et al., 2006). The GDP of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1993 fell to 10% of its 1991 level. Even today, the 1991 level has not been 
reached yet. The official unemployment rate is above 40%. During the war, more than 
400.000 housing units (1/3 of total housing units in the country) were destroyed. Moreover, 
the war has created new vulnerable groups in need of social transfers, such as disabled and/or 
unemployed war veterans and families of killed soldiers. All the above significantly increased 
the number of individuals in the need of some form of social transfers.  
Although Bosnia-Herzegovina has recorded considerable growth rates of its GDP, 
which had positive impact on the reduction of poverty in the country, still about 18% of  
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Bosnian population are below poverty line, while another 30% are just above it (UNDP, 
2006). 
 
3.1. Social security system in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The social security system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is consisted of: unemployment 
insurance; health insurance; pension insurance; child protection; and war-veterans protection. 
The system is based on the schemes of contributory social insurance financed through 
mandatory contributions by employers and employees, and schemes of social assistance 
funded from the budgets of governments from different levels. The system is extremely 
fragmented, being comprised of 13 almost completely independent systems with very low 
degree of coordination between them, which results in large inefficiencies of each of these 
systems. Contributory social insurance schemes are established at the entity level, while social 
assistance schemes are, besides being financed from the entity level budgets, also financed 
from budgets of lower government levels, such as cantons or municipalities (EC, 2008). This 
fragmentation causes large territorial discrepancies in coverage, availability and accessibility 
of social protection and assistance, as well as in the level of the quality of services. 
As already mentioned, Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced very destructive war, which 
resulted in displacement of about a half of total country’s population, destruction of almost 
60% of all housing units (MHRR, 2005), about 200.000 killed, 100.000 war invalids, and 
90.000 families of killed soldiers. In addition, slow post-war recovery and transition into the 
market economy caused very high levels of unemployment. These figures explain while the 
social assistance system is designed to deal with the burdens of war. It is mainly category 
based, without clear focus on most vulnerable groups. As a result, majority of people below 
the poverty line are not covered by social assistance (EC, 2008).  
The fragmented and inefficient system of social assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not 
capable to identify people in state of social need, causes inequality in access to resources 
between different groups and territories. For example, people with the same level of 
disabilities are treated differently, depending on whether they are civilian or war invalids. 
Also, different lower level governments have large differences in the budget available for 
these purposes and provide different amounts of money for the same target group, increasing 
territorial inequality. It is not surprising that such a social system has negligible impact on 
poverty reduction as well.   
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Bosnia-Herzegovina spends about 4% of its GDP on non-insurance social transfers and 
is one of the leading countries
4 in the CEE region (Lindert et al., 2008). This is significantly 
above the OECD countries average of 1.6%. Out of these transfers, about three quarters go to 
veterans-related benefits. Veteran-related benefits include Military Invalids’ Benefits, 
Survivor Dependents’ Benefits, Demobilized Soldiers’ Benefits, and Medal Holders’ 
Allowance. All these are non-means tested, or rights based, benefits. Out of total transfers to 
these categories, around 90% goes to military invalids and survivor dependents. Civilian 
benefits are Non-War Invalids’ Benefits, Civilian Victims of War Benefits, which are rights 
based, plus Social Assistance and Child Protection Allowance, which are means tested. 
Around 20% of total population reported to receive at least one of these benefits. They 
contribute to total consumption of all households by 11%.  
Veteran–related benefits are most regressive, as about 75% of these benefits are received 
by non-poor 27%, and 75% of all these benefits go to those in the richest quintile, opposed to 
the 15% going to those in the poorest quintile. Only 18% of these transfers are received by 
those in the poorest quintile
5 of the population. 
Civilian benefits are somewhat better targeted, as 26% of Child Protection Allowance 
and 30% of Social Assistance Benefits reach those in the poorest quintile. In such a situation, 
it is not surprising that these benefits have very limited impact on poverty reduction. 
According to the BiH Household Budget Survey from 2007, it was estimated that poverty 
headcount ratio is 19.2% without, and 18% with transfers, meaning that transfers reduce 
poverty by only 6%. 
The findings of the World Bank (2009) study suggest these transfers are largely 
ineffective, due to several reasons. First, fragmented political system, where social security 
policies are determined at the entity level and implemented at the canton and municipality 
level. The lack of coordination of policies, eligibility criteria and information about 
beneficiaries further contributes to the inefficiency of such system. Second, different regions 
experienced conflict and destruction of different severity, which increased inequality across 
regions. The social transfers policies implemented at lower level without transfers between 
regions do not contribute to reduction of inequality in different regions and have limited 
effectiveness. Third, due to the all above and the category approach applied to selection of 
beneficiaries, where some household are excluded and other receive transfers from several 
different programs, high under-coverage and leakage rates are present. The World Bank 
                                                 
4 Only Croatia spends slightly larger proportion of its GDP on these transfers. 
5 Here, qiuntiles are based on consumption ranking.  
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(2003), using the LSMS data, reported that only 4% of poor population is covered by some 
form of social assistance, whereas 75% of beneficiaries are not poor. The current 
ineffectiveness of social transfers and their sustainability in the long term require urgent 
reform of this sector. In that context, it is important to understand possible impacts of these 
transfers on the receipt of remittances and their ultimate impact on reduction poverty and 
inequality, once their correlation is taken into account. 
 
  3.2. Migration and remittances in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
During the period of war in Bosnia, about 5% of population were killed, and more than a 
half of its population was displaced. Half of them, or 25% of total population were displaced 
internally, while another 25% of total population decided to flee from the country (Ibreljic et 
al., 2006). Even today, it is estimated that every ninth Bosnian lives abroad (Koser and Van 
Hear, 2002). The return of refugees was significant in the three years following the war 
(1996-1999), mainly as a result of repatriation process6. After that, return process was 
dramatically reduced. In total, around 447.000 people were estimated to be returned from 
abroad until 20077 (UNHCR, 2008). In case of internally displaced people, the estiate is that 
around 578.000 of them returned to their pre-war place of living until 2007 (UNHCR, 2008). 
Another report, from 2005 (Ibreljic et al., 2006) estimated that “330,000 Bosnian refugees 
were still in need of a permanent home… [and] …as many as 836,000 people were still 
displaced from their homes - 490,000 in the FBiH; 346,000 in Republika Srpska“.  
As a consequence of large forced migration outflows during the war period in 1990s, 
Bosnia is the sixth leading country in terms of receiving remittances as a percentage of GDP 
(around 23%, World Bank Global Economic Prospects, 2006). Annual inflows of 
international remittances, through a banking system only, are around 2.4 billion KM (BiH 
Central Bank, 2008). But, the World Network of Bosnian Diaspora estimates these inflows to 
be at least 6 billion, as majority of these remittances are sent as cash transfers through 
informal channels. These remittances inflows are significant source of income for a large 
proportion of BiH population. Moreover, they are six times larger than FDI and three times 
than ODA to this country. The data from the Living in BiH 2004 survey show that 
                                                 
6 Bosnian refugees did not have status of refugees in the Western European countries, but “temporary protection” 
status, which gave the right to these countries to repatriate Bosnian refugees back to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities there. 
7 It has to be noted here that not all of these refugees returned to their pre-war place of living, but to another part 
of the country, which created a new vulnerable category: “returned refugees – internally displaced”.  
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approximately 11% of households in Bosnia-Herzegovina receive remittances. The average 
value of remittances received is about 95 KM per month. There were no analyses of the use of 
remittances in Bosnia, but the sporadic evidence suggests that vast majority of remittances are 
being used for consumption. In one of a few studies on remittances in Bosnia, Oruc (2009) 
found that the remittances receipt has positive, but relatively small impact on the educational 
attainment of children from receiving households. 
  
 
4.  Modelling the “crowding out” effect 
 
4.1. Non-monotonic motives for remittances 
 
 
As presented in the literature review, there are two competing hypotheses about the 
motives for remittances in place, which determine the direction of the “crowding out” effect. 
According to the first, remittances are driven by altruistic motives by senders (Becker, 1974), 
thus any increase in social transfers received by a household will decrease amount of 
remittances received. This is interpreted as crowding-out of private by public transfers (Cox, 
1987). In contrary to this, other authors argue that the remittances are exchange driven, so 
they will increase as a result of increase of social transfers (Bernheim et al., 1985). If this 
effect is predominant, then the public transfers are said to “crowd-in” private ones (Cox, 
1987, 1990; Altonji et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2001). Accordingly, the sign of the impact of 
social transfers on remittances also reveals predominant motive for sending remittances.  
The main purpose of the empirical analysis in this study is to analyse possible crowding-
out effect of social transfers on remittances, both domestic and international, in order to find 
evidence on the sign of relationship between receipts of social transfers and remittances. The 
findings would reveal possible predominant motives for remitting by Bosnians, both in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and abroad, as well as possible negative consequences of the crowding-
out effect on the effectiveness of social transfers policies, by transfer of benefits from 
recipients to senders of remittances. The key difference of this study compared to previous 
ones is that it uses a new approach to the problems of non-monotonic motives for sending 
remittances. The need to test for possible shift in transfer motive by a sender once recipient’s 
income reaches certain threshold is based on the hypothesis that motives for remittances can 
be different at different levels of income. According to this idea, remittances sent to poor are  
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primarily altruistically motivated, while those sent to non-poor are more exchange driven. 
This relationship can be described by the figure below. In one of the earliest works on this 
issue Cox (1997) hypothesized that the relationship between social transfers and remittances 
should be negative at low levels of income, then starting to increase at some threshold level 
(K), such as poverty line, as motives for sending remittances switch from altruism to 
exchange. But, as the income increases, exchange motive causes remittances first to increase 
(up to recipient’s income level depicted by I’ in figure 1) and then to decrease and eventually 
cease (at income level depicted by I’’), making the relationship between social transfer and 
remittances to be negative in the first part and have an inverse U shape in the second.  
 








          K                     I’        I’’ 
 
Source: Cox et al., 2004 
 
The figure above suggests that appropriate specification of the empirical model that will 
capture such a relationship needs to be nonlinear, as well as to account for non-monotonic 
motives by specifying a point where the break occurs (K). Moreover, the break at which 
remittances receipts cease (I’’ in figure 1) needs to be identified. In terms of model 
specifications with alternative dependent variables, it should be notes that Cox et al. (2004) 
suggest the above relationship for amount of remittances received, but not necessarily for 
likelihood of remittances receipt, which means that the above presented theoretical discussion 
of non-monotonic and non-linear effect of social transfers on remittances should be only 





4.2. Empirical specification and estimation methods 
 
Early empirical studies (Lucas and Stark, 1985) used OLS method. As a large 
proportion of migrants do not receive remittances, it was found that such a method produces 
biased and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, two alternatives were used in subsequent 
studies. The first is one stage Tobit model, where the receipt of remittances and the amount 
received is modelled together, and the another one is two stage Heckman’s model, where the 
receipt of remittances is modelled in the first stage and estimated by probit method, while the 
amount received is modelled in the second stage and estimated by the OLS, which is 
corrected for potential sample bias (for example, Hoddinott, 1992; Cox et al., 1998, 2004). 
The main problem of the second approach is the identification problem: the decision which 
variables should be included in the first stage and which in the second stage regression 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Albarran and Attanasio, 2002) argue that the main 
problem with majority of studies of the crowding out effect suffer from an important 
endogeneity problem, as social transfers are typically targeted towards households that are in 
particular need of transfers. But, Bosnia-Herzegovina is an interesting case in that respect, as 
it is an exemption from this rule since, as we saw above, most of the transfers are targeting 
non-poor. Also, some studies (for example, Cox et al., 2004) suggest the possibility of reverse 
causality between the receipt of remittances and pre-transfer income, as remittances may 
affect individuals’ incentives to work. But, studies that controlled for this possibility did not 
find any significant change in the results. 
In this study, the second approach was chosen as more appropriate. In the empirical 
analysis then, the main research question is to be tested by estimation of two different models. 
The first model of the relationship between social transfers and remittances would test the 
direction of the crowding-out effect of the receipt of social transfers on the receipt of 
remittances. It would be estimated by probit. Second model would use amount of social 
transfers and amount of remittances received, both per capita, and would be estimated by 
Heckman’s two-stage method, where the results from the first model will be used as the first 
stage of Heckman’s procedure for calculation of the Inverse Mills ratio. This approach is 
similar to a number of previous studies on the “crowding-out” effect (for example, Altonji et 
al., (2000); Cox et al., 2004; Menezes, 2006). Estimation of two models with different 
dependent variable, one for receipt and another for amount of remittances received, allows us 
to gain insight into the effect of social transfers on both the incidence and volume of 
remittances. The new in this approach is the new solution for the identification problem,  
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which is also a new approach to controlling for the hypothesized differences in the motives 
for remittances at different level of income. Thus, in the second part of the empirical analysis, 
these previously used models would be augmented by additional variables, in order to test for 
hypothesized non-monotonic crowding-out effect between households with different income 
levels. 
One of the key problems with the Heckman’s procedure is the problem of 
identification; which variables should be included in the first stage and which in the second 
stage model. As suggested by Wooldridge (2003: 562), all variables from the second stage 
model should be also included in the first stage model, because their exclusion leads to 
inconsistent estimation if they are incorrectly excluded, while their inclusion is not very 
costly. Nevertheless, there should be at least one variable that is included only in the first 
stage model, basically an instrument, in order to correctly calculate Inverse Mills ratio; 
otherwise it is difficult to distinguish between sample selection and misspecified functional 
form. The choice of such a variable is not straightforward, as anything that affects incidence 
of remittances is likely to affect the amount as well. We could expect that some of the 
household’s demographic variables that influence incidence of transfers, such as household 
size, number of children, education or marital status of household’s head, do not necessarily 
affect the amount received.  
In order to control for hypothesized non-monotonic relationship between social transfers 
and remittances, two different solution regarding appropriate empirical specifications will be 
used in the second stage of Heckman’s procedure
8. The first one is specification of the model 
where interaction variable between poverty (a dummy variable for non-poor households) and 
social transfers, as well as its squared value, controlling for non-linear shape of the 
relationship, will be used. It is based on the assumption made in previous studies (e.g. Cox, 
1987) that the motives for remittances are primarily altruistic if sent to poor households, so 
we could expect the break point K in the Figure 1 to be at the poverty line. In the second 
model specification, a set of dummy variables for income deciles and their interactions with 
variable on social transfers will be introduced. Dummy variables should control for the 
likelihood of receipts of remittances for different income deciles, while the interaction 
variables will reveal possible direction and magnitude of the “crowding out” effect between 
different deciles. In this specification, we should expect that we have negative effect of social 
transfers on amount of remittances received by households at lower income deciles, positive 
                                                 
8 As explained above, amount of remittances received, but not necessarily the likelihood of receipt, is expected 
to have non-monotonic and nonlinear relationship with the amount of social transfers received.  
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effect at the middle of income distribution, and again negative effect for top deciles. The 
second specification has advantage over the first one, as it is not necessary to make 
assumption about the break point. 
The model to be estimated in the first part of empirical analysis is presented by 
following equation: 
 
i u HH TST HINCPC Y + + + + = 3 2 1 0 β β β β       ( 1 )  
 
where: 
Y – dependent variable, expressed as a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a household receives 
remittances, 0 otherwise, 
HINCPC – a variable on pre-transfer income, which is average income of household in KM, per 
capita, 
TST – average amount of monthly social transfers received by household in KM, per capita, 
HH - set of household’s demographic characteristics which are hypothesized to influence receipt and 
amount of remittances, including household head’s gender (fhh) which takes value of 1 if household’s 
head is female, age (age), education level (primedu, secedu, tertedu) where primedu takes value of 1 
if household head has primary education and so on, household size (hhsize), number of children in the 
household (numkids), marital status (marital) which takes value of 1 if a household head is married, 
and employment status (empl) which takes value of 1 if household head is employed. 
 
  In the second stage, two different model specifications will be used to control for non-
monotonic and nonlinear effect of social transfers on the amount of remittances received by 
households. The first model to be estimated is: 
 
i u TSTNPSQ TSTNP NP HH TST HINCPC Y + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β β  (1) 
 
where: 
Y – dependent variable, expressed as amount of monthly remittances received by household, per 
capita (amount divided by household size), 
HINCPC, TST and HH – as above, 
NP – a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a person is not poor, 0 otherwise, 
TSTNP – interaction variable between variables TST and NP. This variable tests the hypothesis of 
non-monotonic motives for sending remittances, based on the poverty status of a household,  
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TSTNPSQ – squared value of TSTNP, in order to test nonlinear effect of social trasners on 
remittances among the non-poor, 
ui – error term. 
 
In this case, as we have interaction term between poverty status of a household and 
amount of social transfers received, the coefficient of the original TST variable now measures 
the effect of amount of transfers received on remittances among poor households. 
The second model is: 
 
i u TSTDEC DEC HH TST HINCPC Y + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β  (1) 
 
where: 
Y, HINCPC, TST, and HH– as above, 
DEC – a set of nine dummy variables indicating to which income decile household belongs, first 
(lowest) decile  being the benchmark category, 
TSTDEC – interaction variable between variables TST and DEC, which should control for the both 
nonlinear and non-monotonic effect of social transfers and remittances, based on income distribution.  





The dataset used for the purpose of empirical analysis in this study is the “Living in 
BiH” survey conducted by Statistical Agency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This survey based on 
the World Bank’s LSMS survey conducted in 2001. Then, the Statistical Agency of Bosnia-
Herzegovina conducted three waves of “Living in BiH” survey in 2002, 2003 and 2004. For 
this analysis, survey from 2004 was chosen because it contains the most comprehensive set of 
information necessary for this analysis. Besides that, certain time invariant data, such as 
ethnicity of individual, were imputed from the 2001 dataset. The original sample of this 
survey was 3.004 households, but once the observations with the most important information, 
such as age, income, receipt of remittances and social transfers were excluded, the final 
dataset with all the necessary information was 2541 households. The descriptive statistics of 
the variables included in the model is presented in the table below. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable description  Variable name  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Household characteristics 
Number of children in a household  hnoc  2479  2.448  1.382 
Ethnicity of the household's head (1 if ethnic Serb)  serb  2808  0.436  0.496 
Ethnicity of the household's head (1 if ethnic Croat)  croat  2808  0.087  0.282 
Urbanity of place of living of the household's head (1 if rural)  rural  2719  0.344  0.475 
Urbanity of place of living of the household's head (1 if urban area other 
than capital city)  otherurb 2719  0.424  0.494 
Education level of the household's head (1 if completed primary school)  primedu  2541  0.225  0.418 
Education level of the household's head (1 if completed secondary 
school)  secedu 2541  0.465 0.499 
Education level of the household's head (1 if has university degree)  tertedu 2541  0.104  0.306 
Age of the household's head  age  2842  52.574  17.812 
Entity in which individual lives (1 if Republika Srpska)  rs  2842  0.464  0.499 
Gender of the household's head (1 if female)  fhh  2842  0.261  0.439 
Marital status of the household's head (1 if married)  marital_s  2839  0.051  0.220 
Hosehold's size  hhsize  2840  3.063  1.590 
Household's consumption per capita  gall  2842 3,256.534 1,978.847 
1 if a household did not migrate during the war  stayer  2826  0.562  0.496 
Income variables 
Household's average monthly pre-transfer income  hmsal  2842  339.278  517.442 
Poverty status of a household (1 if poor)  pooreu  2840  0.122  0.327 
Poverty status of a household (1 if not poor)  nopoor  2842  0.878  0.328 
Transfer variables 
Amount of monthly domestic remittances received by a household  hbhrema  2842  12.160  39.922 
Amount of monthly international remittances received by a household harema  2842  21.589  81.013 
1 if household received domestic remittances  hbhremr  2842  0.214  0.410 
1 if household received international remittances  haremr  2842  0.190  0.392 
1 if household received pension  hpensionr  2842  0.396  0.489 
Hoousehold's average monthly pension received hpensiona  2842  87.977  148.912 
1 if household received any social transfers other than pensions  hostr  2842  0.073  0.260 
Amount of monthly social transfers other than pensions  hosta  2842  2.866  15.330 
1 if household received any social transfers, includion than pensions  htstr  2842  0.449  0.497 
Amount of monthly social transfers, including pensions  htsta  2842  90.843  148.960 
1 if household received remittances (domestic + international)  hremr  2842  0.336  0.472 
Amount of monthly remittances (domestic + international) received by a 
household  hrema 2842  33.749  90.120 
 
The cross-tabulation of receivers of remittances and social transfers is presented in the table 
below.  
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Table 2. Proportions of household according to receipt of social and remittances 
  Does not receive 
remittances 
Receives remittances  Total 









Source: Own calculations 
 
As we can see from the table above, the data from the Living in BiH 2004 survey show that 
the percentage of households receiving both social transfers and remittances is quite large, as almost 
17% of individuals receive both social transfers and remittances. This means that a possibility for large 
crowding out effect of social transfers on remittances exists. 
 
 
5.  Results 
  
The results of the two models are presented in the Table 6 below. The column “Model 1” 
presents the results of the probit estimation of the model of the determinants of receipt of remittances, 
which is the first stage of the Heckman’s approach, whereas the columns “Model 2” and “Model 3” 
present the results of the Heckman’s second stage estimation of the two specifications of the model of 
determinants of amount of remittances, as described above.  
 
Table 3. Estimated coefficients of the alternative models 
Variable description  Variable name  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Household characteristics   


















Urbanity of place of living of the 




Employment status of household's 




Employment status of household's 




Gender of the household's head (1 if 







Variable description  Variable name  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 




Decile 2 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 2), benchmark 
catergory is decile 1 
d2   
  44.782
(156.114) 
Decile 3 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 3)  d3   
  161.474
(159.970) 
Decile 4 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 4)  d4   
  246.924
(165.780) 
Decile 5 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 5)  d5   
  377.087**
(151.864) 
Decile 6 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 6)  d6   
  220.375
(150.496) 
Decile 7 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 7)  d7   
  396.896***
(154.127) 
Decile 8 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 8) 
 
d8   
  465.254***
(146.823) 
Decile 9 (1 if households belongs to 
income decile 9)  d9   
  785.135***
(146.535) 
Decile 10 (1 if households belongs to 




Income variables   
Household's average monthly pre-












Poverty status of a household (1 if not 
poor)  np   
370.983*** 
(116.805)   
 
Transfer variables   
Amount of monthly social transfers 






Interaction variable between htsta 
and nopoor  tstnp   
-0.175 
(410.258)   
Squared interaction variable between 
htsta and nopoor  tstnpsq   
 
 
Interaction term between tst and d2  tstd2   
  -0.232
(0.879) 
Interaction term between tst and d3  tstd3   
  0.315
(1.665) 
Interaction term between tst and d4  tstd4   
  -0.299
(1.062) 
Interaction term between tst and d5  tstd5   
  0.238
(1.193) 
Interaction term between tst and d6  tstd6   
  -0.231
(2.672) 




Variable description  Variable name  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Interaction term between tst and d8  tstd8   
  -0.257
(0.656) 
Interaction term between tst and d9  tstd9   
  -0.443
(0.858) 









No. of observations    2790 2790 2790 
No. of uncensored observations     777 777 
Wald chi
2     25.76 107.94 
**** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
 
The coefficient of the Inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant at only 10% level of 
significance, and only in the Model 2. This provides weak support to the need for estimating the model 
by controlling for possible selection of remittance recipients by using Heckman’s procedure. The 
coefficient of the income variable, the main factor influencing both receipt and amount received, is 
negative and statistically significant in all models. Moreover, squared term of the income variable is 
positive and statistically significant in all three models. This confirms the hypothesis of negative, but 
nonlinear, impact of income of recipients on both the incidence and amount of remittances received. 
The key demographic characteristics influencing receipt of remittances, according to the results of the 
models estimated, are household’s size, number of children in a household, place of living, as well as 
age, gender and employment status of a household’s head
9. These results are in line with the previous 
studies. More children in a household increase both the probability of receipt of remittances and the 
amount received. Negative sign of the coefficient for household size variable need to be interpreted 
taking into account that the variable on number of children in also included, thus this variable 
probably captures number of adult members in a household, for which we can expect to reduce 
incidence of receipt and amount of remittances received, holding other factors constant. Employment 
status of household’s head reduces amount of remittances received, which is what we could have 
expected. Female headed households are more likely to receive remittances, which is also in line with 
most of previous studies (e.g. Menezes, 2007). 
The coefficient of the key variable of interest in this study, the one on social transfers, is 
statistically significant and positive in the model 1. This suggests that the receipt of social transfers 
                                                 
9 Also, other variables that were used in previous studies, such as age of household’s head, marital status and 
other level of urbanity and education, were included in the initial specification of the model, but were 
statistically largely insignificant.  
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increase likelihood of receipt of remittances, i.e. that remittances are primarily driven by exchange 
motive. The same coefficient in models 2 and 3, once interaction terms are included in the model, 
needs to be interpreted carefully. Inclusion of interaction variables changes the meaning of 
original variables in a way that it represents the omitted category from the interaction term. 
Therefore, the interpretation of coefficients cannot be done separately, as they indicate 
differences between different categories, but they need to be summed up if we want to 
calculate the effect of variable for particular category on the dependent variable. In that sense, 
we present the table with calculated coefficients for each category, one by summing up 
coefficients for original variable and original coefficient for each new category representing 
difference between original variable (omitted category) and that particular category
10.  
 
Table 4. Estimated linear combinations of coefficients 
No Category  Coefficient  Standard  error 
Model 2 
1  Social transfers – non-poor  -0.149  1.075 
 
Model 3 
2  Social transfers – decile 2  0.108  1.305 
3  Social transfers – decile 3  -0.439  1.927 
4  Social transfers – decile 4  0.176  1.434 
5  Social transfers – decile 5  -0.361  1.538 
6  Social transfers – decile 6  0.107  2.843 
7  Social transfers – decile 7  0.624  1.662 
8  Social transfers – decile 8  0.133  1.170 
9  Social transfers – decile 9  0.319  1.293 
10  Social transfers – decile 10  0.217  1.240 
Source: Own calculations 
 
In model 2, the benchmark category is poor household. Consequently, original coefficient for 
social transfers measures their effect on receipt of remittances by poor households. Coefficient for 
interaction term between social transfers and dummy variable for non-poor households measures the 
difference in the effect of social transfers on remittance receipts between poor and non-poor. The 
coefficient in the table 2 measures the effect of social transfers on receipt of remittances by non-poor 
households. The coefficients for both poor and non-poor households are statistically insignificant, 
which suggests that the receipt of social transfers does not affect amount of remittances received. In 
                                                 
10 These coefficients were calculated by using lincom command in STATA.  
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model 3, although controlling for differences in income status between households in more detail, we 
do not observe significant effect of social transfers on the amount of remittances for any income 
deciles, as all coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
The regression diagnostics tests do not reveal any significant problem that might affect 




6.  Conclusions 
The above empirical analysis of the existence of the “crowding out” effect is the first 
known study on this issue for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, although there is much room 
for improvement, the results presented above should provide useful insight into the existence 
of relationship between these two types of transfers, and consequently on the extent of 
contribution of these transfers to reduction of poverty and inequality in the country. 
The results of the econometric estimation of the models of the relationship between 
remittances and social transfers suggest that the predominant motive for sending remittances 
to Bosnia is exchange. Remittance receipts increases as social transfers increase. This means 
that social transfers increase likelihood of receiving remittances, but not necessarily that they 
“crowd-in” remittances, as the effect of social transfers on the amount of remittances is not 
significant. This only means that there is significant degree of “matching” between social 
transfers and remittances receipts, or that the same individuals receive both types of transfers. 
As previous studies have shown, social transfers are category based and have relatively poor 
targeting and negligible impact on poverty in the country. This may be result of higher “social 
capital” by receivers of remittances which eases their access to social transfers. So, we might 
possible speak about the “crowding-in” effect of remittances on social transfers here. The 
results of the test for possible non-monotonic pattern in the motives for remittances do not 
support the hypothesis that remittances to poor people are primarily altruistically motivated, 
while those sent to non-poor are driven by the exchange motive.  
  The above results have important implications from a policy perspective. In a country 
with large social transfers that are category based and inefficient, inflows of remittances that 
are not pro-poor additionally decrease efficiency of social transfers and deepen inequality 
between recipients and non-recipients of either private or public transfers further. 
                                                 
11 Detailed regression results, as well as results of diagnostic testing, are available from author on request.  
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Consequently, inflows of remittances cannot be considered as a remedy for inefficient social 
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